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Financial technology (‘FinTech’) is transforming finance and challenging its regulation at an 
unprecedented rate. Two major trends stand out in the current period of FinTech development. 
The first is the speed of change driven by the commoditization of technology, Big Data 
analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence. The second is the increasing number 
and variety of new entrants into the financial sector, including pre-existing technology and e-
commerce companies. This paper considers the impact of these new entrants with their 
typically large pre-existing non-financial services customer bases. These firms (loosely termed 
‘TechFins’) may be characterised by their capacity to leverage the data gathered in their 
primary business into financial services. In other words, TechFins represent an Uber moment 
in finance. This shift from financial intermediary (FinTech) to data intermediary (TechFin) 
raises implications for incumbent financial services firms, FinTech startups and regulators. 
This seachange calls for analysis to underpin regulatory approaches with a view to balancing 
the competing interests of innovation, development, financial stability and consumer 
protection. 
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There are two big opportunities in [the] future financial industry. One is online banking, 
all the financial institutions go online; the other one is internet finance, which is purely 
lead by outsiders … the financial industry needs spoilers to make a revolution.1  
Jack Ma, Alibaba, 2013 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on the trend of non-financial firms (such as technology, e-commerce and 
telecommunications companies) entering financial services businesses and the associated 
regulatory and legal challenges which are already arising. China has been at the forefront of 
this change, with Alibaba raising the profile of its entry in the financial services sector with the 
creation of Ant Financial in 20162 and with its founder, Jack Ma, often said to have coined the 
term ‘TechFin’.3  
                                                          
1
  Quoted from People’s Daily (in Chinese), 21 Jun. 2013 by Lydia Guo, “Alibaba: Shaking Up Finance”, 
Financial Times, 1 July 2013, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0cae83c4-c936-367c-9bf8-
d5a082c9597e. 
2
  Alibaba’s financial services activities (including payment services) are now bundled in a separate finance 
holding company, Ant Financial, of which Alibaba is the controlling shareholder. Ant Financial runs Alipay 
(https://intl.alipay.com/), the largest payments network worldwide, with 400 million customers, and WeBank, 
which offers short-term loan services to Chinese customers shopping on Alibaba.com: see “Alipay Rolls 
Credit for Consumers”, available at: http://www.pymnts.com/news/2015/alipay-rolls-credit-for-consumers/ (5 
Jan. 2015) (last accessed 7 March 2017).  Ant Financial also runs MyBank, which similarly focuses on micro 
lending, but tends to take on greater credit risk than Tencent’s WeBank as it lends money from its own balance 
sheet rather than acting as an intermediary between borrowers and lenders. Further, Ant Financial runs a wealth 
management platform named Yu’e Bao, which emerged from the eponymous money market fund launched in 
June 2013 and is now among the world’s five largest money market funds by assets. Alibaba ‘decision’ to 
separate Ant into a separate licensed financial services holding company – albeit under its continued control 
– by renaming and subsidiarising Alipay in Oct. 2014 was the direct result of fears over possible systemic risk 
arising from both Alipay and Yu’e Bao, resulting in a new drive in China to build a regulatory system to 
address FinTech. See Weihuan Zhou, Douglas Arner & Ross Buckley, “Regulation of Digital Financial 
Services in China: Last Mover Advantage?”, 8:1 Tsinghua China Law Review 2, 2-39 (2015). 
3
  Zen Soo, “TechFin: Jack Ma Coins Term to Set Alipay’s Goal to Give Emerging Markets Access to Capital”, 
South China Morning Post, 2 Dec. 2016, available at: http://www.scmp.com/tech/article/2051249/techfin-
jack-ma-coins-term-set-alipays-goal-give-emerging-markets-access. While Jack Ma may have built the 
leading business model and perhaps inspired the term with the quote at the beginning of section 1 of this paper 
(and significant OpEd in China’s People’s Daily in which it appeared), it does not appear that he actually 
coined the term ‘TechFin’. Moreover, there is no clear consensus in the meaning of the term. See Chris 
Skinner, “Is It FinTech or TechFin (Part I)”, Digitalist Magazine, 7 January 2016, available at: 
http://www.digitalistmag.com/customer-experience/2016/01/07/fintech-or-techfin-03925833 and “Is It 
FinTech or TechFin (Part II)”, Digitalis Magazine, 11 January 2016, available at: 
http://www.digitalistmag.com/resource-optimization/2016/01/11/fintech-or-techfin-2-03926161 These two 
pieces appear to be the first published reference to the term and argue – contrary to Jack Ma’s definition – that 
in fact TechFin is about incumbent financial services firms using technology to transform their businesses. 
For the first use of TechFin as defined by Ma and also the approach we take in this paper, see Janos Barberis, 
“From FinTech to TechFin: Data Is the New Oil”, Asian Banker, 16 May 2016, available at: 
http://www.theasianbanker.com/updates-and-articles/from-fintech-to-techfin:-data-is-the-new-oil. For yet 
another view, see: Ryan Shea, “FinTech versus TechFin: Does Technology Offer Real Innovation or Simply 
Improve What is Out There?”, Thompson Reuters, 26 July 2016, available at: 
https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/financial-risk/fintech-innovation/fintech-versus-techfin-technology-offer-
real-innovation-simply-improve/ (stating that ‘Fintech companies are driven by the desire to apply emerging 
technologies to radically alter the financial landscape. Techfin companies, in contrast, apply technology to 
enhance existing financial capabilities. A less disruptive, more incremental approach.’ (emphasis in original)). 
Thus, TechFin is incremental while FinTech seeks disruption in Shea’s definition (similar to that of Skinner 
and contrasting to the approach of Ma and the authors of this paper). However there is an Australian company 
4 
 
This trend may be less obvious in other countries (perhaps due to their more developed 
regulatory or financial systems) but it is nonetheless happening. Amazon (US),4 Apple (US),5 
Facebook (US),6 Google (US),7 Microsoft (US),8 Samsung (Korea), with Kakao9 and Samsung 
                                                          
apparently formed in 2013 called Techfin that probably deserves the credit for the term (and whose business 
actually focuses on financing technology): http://www.techfin.com.au/ (last accessed 6 April 2017)  
4
  Cf. Amazon Lending provided by Amazon Capital Services: see “Amazon offering loans to its online sellers”, 
available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-amazon-lending-idUSBRE88Q1CC20120927 (27 Sep. 
2012) (last access 6 March 2017). The practice is described as an outreach service from Amazon to small 
businesses: see https://www.fundera.com/blog/amazon-lending (3 Aug. 2016) (last accessed 6 March 2017). 
Moreover, Amazon has announced its “Amazon Cash” feature gradually entering into the banking space. See 
“Amazon’s next customer: Americans who don’t have a bank account”, available at: 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/amazons-next-customer-americans-who-dont-have-a-bank-account-
2017-04-04 (5 April 2017) (last accessed 7 April 2017). 
5
  Cf Apple Pay (http://www.apple.com/au/apple-pay/). 
6
  See on the e-money service provided by Facebook: “Facebook targets financial services”, available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/0e0ef050-c16a-11e3-97b2-00144feabdc0 (14 August 2014); “Why Facebook Is a 
Dark Horse in the Financial Services Industry”, available at: https://letstalkpayments.com/why-facebook-is-
a-dark-horse-in-the-financial-services-industry/ (21 October 2016) (last accessed 6 March 2014). 
7
  Cf. Google Wallet payment services (https://www.google.com/wallet/) as well as its foreseen Google-powered 
financial services hub. At the time of writing, Google offers mortgage comparison and insurance comparison 
services in the US: “Is Google banking on financial services?”, available at: 
http://www.cbronline.com/news/verticals/consumer-markets/is-google-banking-on-financial-services-
4785109/ (January 2016) (last accessed 6 March 2017). 
8
  Cf. on Microsoft Payments “It’s Official: Microsoft Is Licensed To Do Payments”, available at: 
http://www.pymnts.com/news/2015/its-official-microsoft-is-licensed-to-do-payments/ (last accessed 20 
March 2017) (stating that “Microsoft was approved for its Idaho (Money Services Business -MSB) license on 
March 24, 2015, and no other state has yet issued a license, according to mortgage information service NMLS. 
However, Microsoft told FinCEN that it plans to operate as a money services business in all 50 U.S. states.”). 
See further the description of Microsoft’s Wallet app (“Pay for your purchases the easy and more secure way 
with Microsoft Wallet and your Windows phone. Keep your payment cards, rewards and membership cards 
all in one place, so you have your cards available when and where you need them. It's easy, convenient, and 
more secure than using your credit card alone.”), available at: https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/store/p/microsoft-wallet/9nblgggzlm1p (last accessed 20 March 2017). 
9
  Kakao Pay started as a messaging app, Kakao Talk, developing into the first firm to be granted a banking 
licence for online operations. See “Kakao, KT Surge After South Korea Grants Online Banking Permits”, 
Bloomberg (29 November 2015) available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-29/south-
korea-grants-kakao-kt-led-groups-permits-for-online-banks (last accessed 15 April 2017). 
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Pay10, Tencent (China)11, Vodafone (UK, India and Africa),12 and Uber (US)13 all offer various 
forms of payment, lending and/or other financial services.  
As these established tech firms enter the world of finance, important questions arise: how do 
these firms fit within the framework of financial regulation?14 To what extent do their activities 
signal arbitrage opportunities and deficiencies of the current regulatory system?  
This paper begins to tackle these questions. Following this introduction, in Part 2, we seek to 
describe the features that distinguish TechFin companies from other financial sector 
participants, in particular incumbent financial institutions and FinTech startups. In Parts 3 and 
4, we outline the opportunities created by TechFins as well as the reasons for regulatory 
concern, before in Part 5 analysing the policy options available to regulators in responding to 
TechFin. Part 6 concludes.  
 
2. FINTECHS AND TECHFINS, DIGITISATION AND DATAFICATION 
 
Six decades into the computer revolution, four decades since the invention of the 
microprocessor, and two decades into the rise of the modern Internet, all of the technology 
required to transform industries through software finally works and can be widely 
delivered at global scale. … In some industries, particularly those with a heavy real-world 
component such as oil and gas, the software revolution is primarily an opportunity for 
incumbents. But in many industries, new software ideas will result in the rise of new Silicon 
Valley-style start-ups that invade existing industries with impunity. Over the next 10 years, 
the battles between incumbents and software-powered insurgents will be epic. Joseph 
Schumpeter, the economist who coined the term “creative destruction,” would be proud.15 
                                                          
10
  Samsung Pay (http://www.samsung.com/au/apps/samsungpay/) is a mobile wallet service (“Samsung Pay 
launches in Australia, time to ditch your wallet (and your train ticket?)”: available at: 
https://www.cnet.com/au/news/samsung-pay-launches-in-australia/ (15 June 2016) (last accessed 6 March 
2017).  
11  Tencent runs a payment platform (Tenpay, accounting for approximately 20-30% of Chinese online payments) 
as well as a virtual bank named WeBank (an intermediary between borrowers and lenders) that operates a no-
collateral micro lending service called Weilidai. See “Tencent’s WeChat App to Offer Personal Loans in 
Minutes”, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/tencent-to-add-personal-loan-feature-to-wechat-app-
1441952556) (11 September 2015) (last accessed 8 March 2017). Loans do not require collateral or guarantees 
provided the borrower makes it onto a ‘white list’ put together by the WeBank and WeChat teams. Weilidai 
has more than 20 million white list users, 660,000 active borrowers and a loan balance of CNY7.5 billion.  
12
  Cf. M-Pesa (payment services, for India see https://www.mpesa.in/portal/ ) and M-KESHO (in partnership 
with Kenya-based Equity Bank, M-KESHO is a product using M-PESA’s platform and agent network that 
offers expanded banking services like interest-bearing accounts, loans, and insurance. See 
http://www.financialaccess.org/blog/2015/7/16/m-kesho-in-kenya-a-new-step-for-m-pesa-and-mobile-
banking) (27 May 2010) (last accessed 6 March 2017). 
13
  Cf. Uber Car Loan Finance, see http://ubercarloans.com.au/?utm_campaign=Uber (last accessed 6 April 
2017). 
14
   Financial System Inquiry, Interim Report - Regulation in a digital environment, Commonwealth of Australia 
2017, http://fsi.gov.au/publications/interim-report/09-technology/regulation-digital-environment/ (last 
accessed 21 April 2017). 
15
  M. Andreesen, “Why Software is Eating the World”, Wall Street Journal, 20 August 2011 (available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460 or 
http://a16z.com/2016/08/20/why-software-is-eating-the-world/). 
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Marc Andreesen, Andreesen Horowitz, 2011 
 
FEATURES OF FINTECH & REGTECH 
‘FinTech’ in its broadest sense16 refers to the use of technology to deliver financial solutions.17 
It is a long standing process, spanning to date three eras18, that has recently accelerated.19 This 
ever present use of technology in finance is gradually putting pressure to transit from 
regulations designed to control for human behaviour to a regulator looking at supervising 
automation processes.20 In other words, FinTech growth has elicited the need for RegTech.21 
‘RegTech’ is a contraction of the terms ‘regulatory’ and ‘technology’,22 and describes the use 
of technology, particularly information technology (‘IT’), in the context of regulation, 
monitoring, reporting and compliance.23  
Prior to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, FinTech was driven by incumbent financial 
institutions and their spending on technology to support their operations, for instance in the 
context of risk management and internet banking. It often also took place in close partnership 
with regulators, for instance in the context of development of electronic payment (e.g. 
SWIFT,24 Visa)25 and securities (e.g. NASDAQ) systems.26 Since 2008, the major catalyst for 
FinTech development has been a new wave of FinTech startups.27 While the novelty of this 
                                                          
16
  We admit difficulties in defining FinTech with legal certainty. For evidence on the FinTech multiverse of 
definitions, see P Schueffel, Taming the Beast: A Scientific Definition of FinTech, Journal of Innovation 
Management 4,4 (2016) 32-54. The same is true for TechFins. Hence, we prefer the term “TechFin” to be 
understood more as one describing a perspective rather than serving as a formal definitional concept. 
17
  DW Arner, J Barberis and RP Buckley, ‘The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?’ (2016) 47 
(4) Georgetown Journal of International Law, 1271. 
18
  DW Arner, J Barberis and RP Buckley, ‘The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?’, (2016) 47 
(4) Georgetown Journal of International Law, 1271. 
19
 FinTech – reimagining and reinventing financial services (2015) Ernst & Young 
http://www.ey.com/gl/en/industries/financial-services/fso-insights-fintech-reimagining-and-reinventing-
financial-services (last accessed 25 April 2017). 
20
  See generally Deloitte and Aegis, Opportunities in Telecom Sector: Arising from Big Data (November 2015). 
21
  INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, REGTECH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS FOR 
COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING 5-8 (March 2016). 
22
  Innovating with RegTech (2016) Ernst & Young, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
Innovating-with-RegTech/$FILE/EY-Innovating-with-RegTech.pdf. (last accessed 25 April 2017). 
23
  DW Arner, J Barberis and RP Buckley, “FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualisation of Financial 
Regulation”, 37 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (forthcoming 2017). 
24
  SWIFT, SWIFT history, https://www.swift.com/about-us/history (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
25
  Visa continues to form FinTech partnerships: Visa hunts Australian and New Zealand fintech start-ups with 
launch of contest, Australian Fintech, https://australianfintech.com.au/visa-hunts-australian-and-new-
zealand-fintech-start-ups-with-launch-of-contest/ (21 April 2017). 
26
   For a history of Nasdaq’s FinTech partnerships see: Nasdaq, Empowering FinTech Innovation, 
http://business.nasdaq.com/campaigns/fintech (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
27
   Laurens Kolkman, Bank-less future: how FinTech Start-ups might take over the Financial System (3 March 
2016)  KPMG, https://home.kpmg.com/nl/en/home/social/2016/03/bank-less-future-how-fintech-start-ups-
might-take-over-the-financial-system.html (last accessed 21 April 2017); Chris Myers, ‘FinTech’s ‘Third 
Wave’ Is Coming, And It Will Change Everything’ Forbes, 3 October 2016, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrismyers/2016/10/03/fintechs-third-wave-is-coming-and-it-will-change-
everything/#7903f61c6026 (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
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trend can be challenged, with previous examples found including Bloomberg in the early 
1980s28 and PayPal in the 1990s,29 there is no denying that there has been a dramatic increase 
in new entrants into financial services in the past ten years.30  
The distinctions emerge not as to what (i.e. technology in finance) but as to who (i.e. type of 
market participant – startups vs incumbents).31 This new wave of FinTech over the last ten 
years has tended to develop from the bottom up, i.e. it is born mostly in agile startups that seek 
to disrupt (i.e. BitCoin),32 compete with (i.e. LendingClub),33 do business with (i.e. Dwolla),34 
or be acquired by (i.e. Fidor),35 incumbent financial institutions.36 This new startup trend – 
combined with post crisis regulatory reforms driving structural change within the industry – is 
pushing incumbent financial institutions to increasingly focus on technology in order to 
compete with the threat posed by emerging startups.37 
                                                          
28
  Robin Wigglesworth, ‘The Bloomberg terminal: clunky, costly, addictive, ubiquitous’, The Financial Times, 
8 July 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/5d6c2d9c-1f61-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0 (last accessed 25 April 
2017); Harry McCracken, How the Bloomberg Terminal Made History – And Stays Ever Relevant (6 
October 2015) Fast Company https://www.fastcompany.com/3051883/the-bloomberg-terminal  (last 
accessed 25 April 2017). 
29
   Michael Chesher, Rukesh Kaura and Peter Linton, Electronic Business & Commerce (Springer, 2013) 56. 
30
   Samantha Barnes, ‘Peer-to-Peer Lending – Disruption for the Banking Sector?’ International Banker, 9 
February 2015, https://internationalbanker.com/banking/peer-peer-lending-disruption-banking-sector/.  
31
   See Jorge Ruiz, ‘Citi’s Story of Innovation’ in Susanne Chishti and Janos Barberis, The FINTECH Book: 
The Financial Technology Handbook for Investors, Entrepreneurs and Visionaries (John Wiley & Sons, 
2016) 203. 
32
   Rainer Böhme,, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman and Tyler Moore, ‘Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, 
and Governance’ (2015) 29(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 213, 214; Everett Rosenfeld, ‘Forget 
currency, bitcoin’s tech is the revolution’, CNBC, 13 November 2014, 
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/13/forget-currency-bitcoin-tech-could-disrupt-massively.html (last accessed 
25 April 2017); James Eyers, ‘Bitcoin could disrupt banks warns Westpac boss’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 
September 2015 http://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/bitcoin-could-disrupt-banks-warns-
westpac-boss-20150908-gjhjnk.html (last accessed 25 April 2017). 
33
  Sriharsha Reddy and Krishna Gopalaraman, ‘Peer to Peer Lending, Default Prediction-Evidence from 
Lending Club’ (2016) 21(3) Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce 1, 2. 
34
  Jeremy Quittner, ‘Dwolla to Offer Banks Analysis on Mobile Use’ (2011) 176(76) American Banker 9. 
35
  ‘Fidor Bank Acquired by France’s BPCE Groupe’, Let’s Talk Payments, 29 July 2016, 
https://letstalkpayments.com/fidor-bank-acquired-by-frances-bpce-groupe/ (last accessed 25 April 2017).  
36
   Ian Pollari and Jan Reinmueller, Building effective fintech partnerships ‘the digital future’ for banks, 
KPMG, 10 February 2017, https://home.kpmg.com/au/en/home/insights/2017/02/effective-fintech-
partnerships-enable-banks-succeed-digital-innovation-trail-fs.html (last accessed 21 April 2017); Marika 
Vilen, ‘The Fintech startups partnership model’, Thomson Reuters, 5 January 2017, 
https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/fintech-startups-partnership-model/ (last accessed 21 April 
2017); Rene Lacerte, ‘Is 2017 The Year Bank-Fintech Partnerships Hit Product/Market Fit?’, Forbes, 13 
February 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/02/13/is-2017-the-year-bank-
fintech-partnerships-hit-productmarket-fit/#28ef623b3c6e (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
37
   Nathaniel Popper, ‘’Fintech’ Start-Up Boom Said to Threaten Bank Jobs’ New York Times, 30 March 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/business/dealbook/fintech-start-up-boom-said-to-threaten-bank-
jobs.html?_r=0  (last accessed 21 April 2017); Emma Dunkley, ‘Fintech start-ups put banks under pressure’ 
Financial Times, 12 September 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/ce8fa350-737f-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a 
(21 April 2017); Clara Guibourg, ‘McKinsey warns banks that fintech startups and alternative finance pose 
threat to traditional banking’s profits’ City A.M., http://www.cityam.com/225503/mckinsey-warns-banks-
fintech-startups-and-alternative-finance-pose-threat-traditional (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
8 
 
RegTech as a phenomenon likewise has its origins before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.38 
Similar to FinTech, it has received a major impetus in the past ten years as financial institutions 
have been driven to spend on new risk management and compliance systems.39 However, in 
contrast to FinTech, RegTech has been more of a top-down phenomenon in which technology 
providers responding to demand from large incumbent financial institutions and regulators to 
address respectively the objectives to decrease regulatory and compliance requirements costs 
as well increase market monitoring capacity.40 Given the significant amounts being spent,41 
this process is having a transformational impact on underlying financial institution systems as 
well as employment.42 It is also providing significant opportunities not only for technology 
(e.g. IBM) 43, information (e.g. Thompson Reuters, Bloomberg) and advisory firms but also for 
startups.44 RegTech itself is not limited to the financial sector although this has been where its 
most important evolution has so far occurred.45 The next stage of the evolution of RegTech 
will likely be in response to demand from regulators seeking to use technology to improve their 
own regulatory capabilities and enhance regulatory outcomes,46 including through the capacity 
to undertake near real time surveillance of the markets they are charged with supervising.47 
                                                          
38
   Deloitte, ‘RegTech is the New FinTech: How Agile Regulatory Technology Is Helping Firms Better 
Understand and Manage Their Risks’, 2015, 2. 
39
   Elena Mesropyan, ‘RegTech Companies in the US Driving Down Compliance Costs to Enable Innovation’, 
Let’s Talk Payments, 25 February 2017, https://letstalkpayments.com/regtech-companies-in-us-driving-
down-compliance-costs-innovation/ (last accessed 21 April 2017); KPMG, ‘Regulatory Technology Services 
(RegTech)’, 2016, 1. 
40
   James Eyers, ‘Welcome to the new world of ‘regtech’, Australian Financial Review, 20 June 2016, 
http://www.afr.com/technology/welcome-to-the-new-world-of-regtech-20160619-gpmj6k (last accessed 21 
April 2017); Beverley Head, ‘ASIC plays in RegTech sandbox’ InnovationAus.com, 8 February 2017, 
http://www.innovationaus.com/2017/02/ASIC-plays-in-RegTech-sandbox/ (last accessed 21 April 2017); 
Kevin Petrasic, Benjamin Saul and Helen Lee, Regtech rising: Automating regulation for financial 
institutions, White & Case (26 September 2016) https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/regtech-
rising-automating-regulation-financial-institutions (last accessed 21 April 2017) . 
41
  ‘The ever-increasing costs of compliance’, Thomson Reuters, 21 May 2015, 
https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/articles/2015/ever-increasing-cost-of-compliance.html (last accessed 25 
April 2017). 
42
  See e.g.: R. Partington, ‘Banks Trimming Compliance Staff as $321 Billion in Fines Abate, Bloomberg, 23 
Mar. 2017 (available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-23/banks-trimming-compliance-
staff-as-321-billion-in-fines-abate);  C. Chanjaroen, ‘StanChart Says Almost “Over Hump” on Costly 
Compliance Upgrades’, Bloomberg, 24 March 2017 (available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-23/stanchart-says-almost-over-hump-on-costly-
compliance-upgrades) (last accessed 5 April 2017).  
43
 See, “IBM Closes Acquisition of Promontory Financial Group” available at:  
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ibm-closes-acquisition-of-promontory-financial-group-
300367181.html (last accessed 7 April 2017). 
44
  See, “Thomson Reuters Further Strengthens KYC Managed Services and Legal Entity Data Through Clarient 
and Avox Acquisitions “ available at: https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-
releases/2017/february/thomson-reuters-strengthens-kyc-managed-services-and-legal-entity-data-through-
clarient-and-avox-acquisitions.html (last accessed 7 April 2017). 
45
   Andrew Cornell, RegTech joins the C-Suite, ANZ Blue Notes (14 February 2017) 
https://bluenotes.anz.com/posts/2017/02/regtech-joins-the-c-suite/ (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
46
 See, “Regtech will extend the long arm of market supervisors” available at: 
http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/regtech-will-extend-the-long-arm-of-market-supervisors-20170404-
gvd31u#ixzz4ddvZyYW0 (last accessed 8 April 2017). 
47  DW Arner, J Barberis and RP Buckley, “FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualisation of Financial 
Regulation”, forthcoming Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, at *; HTC Hu, Too 
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The 2008 Global Financial Crisis opened a new era of FinTech, marked by the arrival of waves 
of new startups delivering either directly (P2P, B2C) or indirectly (B2B) new technologies to 
be used in finance.48 Almost a decade later, RegTech has emerged, representing both a more 
efficient and more effective way to support compliance and reporting functions but also a 
totally new approach to understanding regulation as its shifts from supervision by humans to 
supervision by machines and analysis of data. Both FinTech and RegTech echo the Andreesen 
Horowitz vision that ‘software is eating our world, with the financial and compliance industry 
being digitised49 but not yet datafied (to use the framework of Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and 
Martin Kukier50). 
 
FEATURES OF TECHFIN 
TechFins start with technology and data and add financial services to their value-chain.51 They 
need to be approached differently.52 They typically start with their data and access to 
customers. They then move into the world of finance by leveraging their access to data and 
customers and seek to out-compete incumbent financial firms or FinTech startups.  
This is the critical distinction between a TechFin, a FinTech startup and a traditional financial 
institution. The former begins with relationships with customers in a non-financial services 
setting, collects massive amounts of data from those relationships, and then seeks to make use 
of that data initially perhaps by selling the data to financial services providers or by leveraging 
its customer relationships by serving as a conduit through which its customers can access 
financial services provided by a separate institution, and later by providing financial services 
directly itself.  
A FinTech is typically a startup that identifies a pain point in financial services,53 something 
incumbents do badly or not at all (perhaps as a result of regulatory changes or lack of digital 
customer focus), and seeks to provide a remedy for the pain point, with the goal of selling the 
                                                          
Complex to Depict? Innovation, 'Pure Information,' and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm (May 30, 2012). Texas 
Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 7, 2012, at *. 
48
   Deutsche Bank, FinTech 2.0: Creating new opportunities through strategic alliance, 
http://www.gtb.db.com/docs_new/GTB_FinTech_Whitepaper_A4_SCREEN.pdf. (21 April 2017) 2. 
49
  Cf. M. Andreesen, “Why Software is Eating the World”, Wall Street Journal, 20 August 2011 (available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460 or 
http://a16z.com/2016/08/20/why-software-is-eating-the-world/)  (stating in 2011 that the ‘the financial 
services industry has been visibly transformed by software over the last 30 years. Practically every financial 
transaction, from someone buying a cup of coffee to someone trading a trillion dollars of credit default 
derivatives, is done in software. And many of the leading innovators in financial services are software 
companies …’). 
50
  See V. Mayer-Schonberger & M. Kukier, Big Data: Revolution that Will Transform How We Live, Work and 
Think (Hougton Miflin 2013). 
51
   Ryan Shea, Fintech versus techfin: does technology offer real innovation or simply improve what is out 
there?, Thomson Reuters, 26 July 2016, https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/financial-risk/fintech-
innovation/fintech-versus-techfin-technology-offer-real-innovation-simply-improve/ (last accessed 21 April 
2017). 
52
   See Chris Skinner, Is it fintech or techfin?, BANKNXT (8 February 2016) 
http://banknxt.com/55647/techfin-part-1/ (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
53
   Matthew Smith, When technology trumps finance, Finsia http://www.finsia.com/insights/news/news-
article/2017/04/11/when-technology-trumps-finance (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
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solution service directly to customers or to an incumbent or selling itself to an existing financial 
services firm.54  
Traditional financial services firms, such as banks, typically start with a banking relationship 
with customers and have only recently even begun to consider supplementing their risk analysis 
of customers by using more broadly derived data.55    
The provider with the most accurate, detailed and extensive digitalised information about a 
customer is best placed to analyse that information and data to price credit and insurance 
services for that customer (through datafication: the process of analysing and using data).56 
Traditionally that provider has been the customer’s bank,57 initially armed with a detailed 
questionnaire completed by the customer as to income, expenses, objectives, experience and 
risk tolerance, and fortified by the bank’s knowledge over time of the customer’s financial 
history. However, banks may no longer enjoy this advantage, or at least not for long.58      
The data superiority of TechFins comes from information obtained from various sources that 
combined provide a comprehensive, data-based view of their customers’ (and given their size, 
eventually entire economies’ and potentially the world’s) preferences and behaviours. This data 
may be generated, for instance, from: 
- software companies (Microsoft, Google) aggregating information about users’ 
activities; 
- hardware companies (Huawei, Tesla, Apple) and Internet-of-Things (‘IoT”59) 
companies utilising sensors continually monitoring usage behaviour and location;  
- social media services (Facebook, 60 Tencent) and search engines (Google, 61  Baidu), 
providing insight into social preferences and activities; 
- e-commerce (Amazon, Alibaba, or major retail chains with large market share e.g. Wal-
Mart), providing insight into consumer demand and payment history;62 and 
- telecommunications services providers (Vodafone), providing data on mobile 
activities.63  
                                                          
54
   Imran Gulamhuseinwala, Thomas Bull and Steven Lewis, ‘FinTech is gaining traction and young, high 
income users are the early adopters’ (2015) 3(3) Journal of Financial Perspectives 16, 18. 
55
  We discuss traditional banking only. Quantitative and algorithmic traders are beyond the scope of our analysis. 
56
  Jens-Erik Mai, ‘Big data privacy: The datafication of personal information’ (2016) 32(3) The Information 
Society 192, 193. 
57
  ‘Using customer data effectively’ (2000) 16(3) Banks in Insurance Report 6, 6. 
58
  We admit that we do not know how many data points a bank has stored in its database. We speculate banks 
have access to more and better data than they have traditionally used, and TechFin is likely to push banks to 
use a greater share of data which they control. Even so, certain data points generated at the front end (client 
interface) are beyond the bank’s influence.  
59
  Leading to the equation ‘IoT x FiNTech = FinTernet of Things’, see http://www.fintech.finance/01-news/the-
fin-ternet-of-things-how-iot-affects-financial-services/. 
60
   Steve Lohr, ‘The Age of Big Data’, The New York Times, 11 February 2012; Strategy& PwC, Benefiting 
from big data: A new approach for the telecom industry (2013) 10. 
61
   Leonard Kile, ‘Apple and Google Yield Control Over Consumer Data’ (2016) 20(1) CRM Magazine 14. 
62
   Janos Barberis, ‘From fintech to techfin: data is the new oil’, supra n. 3. 
63
   Nick McKenzie, ‘Your mobile phone records and home address for sale’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 
November 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/business/your-mobile-phone-records-and-home-address-for-sale-
20161116-gsqkwe.html (last accessed 25 April 2017). 
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The data provided by each of these five sources is typically expansive, covers a large proportion 
of the population of the reference markets, and is often deep in terms of the number of data 
points that can be gathered with respect to any given individual.64  
TechFins moving further into financial services, the way analogous Chinese corporations 
(Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba) have done, can relatively quickly assemble much of the information 
the customer’s bank or asset manager possesses, and supplement it with their very detailed 
knowledge of many other aspects of the customer’s choices and preferences.65 These 
preferences can then be processed through algorithms that have established correlations 
between certain preferences and credit-worthiness,66 so as to provide a much more nuanced 
assessment of credit-worthiness than anything a bank could do.  
The amount of data will be more extensive if sources of data are combined. Facebook, Amazon 
and Alibaba are now all doing exactly this in the context of payments in India – competition 
which is likely to be played out in an increasing range of markets around the world.67 And one 
– which as Alibaba’s experience has shown – provides the basis for further expansion of related 
financial services offerings, particularly lending (to consumers and SMEs) as well as cash and 
investment management (e.g. money market funds to hold cash in between transactions without 
the need for cash to exit to a traditional financial institution).68 Due to the trust generated in the 
client relationship TechFins can easily expand their service offerings once the client 
relationship is established.69  
 
DELINEATION 
In order to draw a line between FinTechs and TechFins, it is helpful to first look for their 
similarities. For example, both FinTech and TechFin capitalise on the economies of scale and 
                                                          
64
  The founder of Alibaba, Jack Ma, has stated that Alibaba holds, on average, 20,000 to 25,000 data points on 
any individual client. Number shared by Jack Woo in a conference. Presentation entitled “China’s Financial 
Innovation” presented on 15 October 2015 
65
   Janos Barberis, ‘From fintech to techfin: data is the new oil’, supra n. 3. 
66
   Mikella Hurley and Julius Adebayo, ‘Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data’ (2016) 18(2) Yale Journal of 
Law & Technology 148. 
67
  The recent announcement of whatsapp (owned by facebook) entering the payment space in India is a 
confirmation. See, “WhatsApp plans Indian digital payments” available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/5a1623c4-192d-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87 (last accessed 7 April 2017). This 
echo’s Alibaba taking 40% stake in Paytm in India. See, “Alibaba will hold 40% stake in Paytm's e-comm 
entity “ available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/alibaba-will-hold-40-stake-
in-paytms-e-comm-entity/articleshow/56947046.cms (last accessed 7 April 2017). 
68
  See S. Mundy, “WhatsApp Plans Indian Digital Payment”, Financial Times, 5 April 2017, available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/5a1623c4-192d-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87  
69
  The fact that Chinese Technology companies have been able to enter financial services spaces faster than its 
US counterpart can be due to two factors. First, a large regulatory arbitrage whereby interest payable on e-
wallets was higher than traditional bank account. Second, the perception that financial secrecy of customers 
is better kept by a private institutions than a public, state owned bank, especially in context of tax reporting. 
The perception of trust is changing even in developed economies. A recent Accenture Survey has pointed out 
that Millennials found Google and Amazon attractive alternatives to traditional financial providers. See, 
“Financial Providers: Transforming Distribution Model For Evolving Consumer”, Accenture (11 January 
2017), available at https://www.accenture.com/t20170111T041601__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/next-
gen-3/DandM-Global-Research-Study/Accenture-Financial-Services-Global-Distribution-Marketing-
Consumer-Study.pdf (last accessed 9 April 2017). 
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scope offered by technology (including but not limited to network effects).70 However, while 
FinTechs may build or acquire data sets over time (such as peer-to-peer lending platforms) and 
are frequently focused on data analysis (with algorithms integrating data from various 
sources71), FinTechs are focused on finance first and the application of Tech to deliver 
improved Fin.  
Whilst financial institutions have digitised, or are about to digitise themselves, technology 
companies have been digital and data driven from day one. This extends to business models 
with banks being interest / fee generating (digitising money) whilst Google and Facebook are 
selling information (monetising data).72 The digitisation of bank processes does not translate 
into the change of business model that could make them TechFin companies. In short, a 
FinTech is a financial intermediary whilst a TechFin is data intermediary. 
TechFins rely on large-scale data sets and businesses developed in their primary course of 
business and then put them to use in financial services. They may do so by considering, or even 
providing, the front-end of financial services, i.e. the link between financial intermediary and 
client.73 When providing services, they may rely on de-individualised datasets, aggregating 
huge amounts of data in order to verify assumptions as to the client’s solvency, payment 
behaviour, savings discipline, and other relevant factors. All in all, for TechFins, data 
accumulation and analytics are key, beginning with self-developed algorithms that look 
directly for data correlations, and later advancing to machine learning and AI.  
  
TECHFIN STAGES 
The push of a TechFin into financial services typically comes in three stages. First, a tech firm 
takes advantage of its data intensive, front-end (i.e. customer connected) business model, either 
by licensing out aggregate data to incumbent financial institutions or FinTechs (enabling data 
analytics e.g. in the context of lending or investment decisions) or, less likely initially, by 
testing their data sets and selling the results to financial institutions (so that the using 
institutions can gather information on correlations e.g. Thomson Reuters).  
In the second stage, the TechFin uses these datasets to guide its own business decisions, for 
instance in improving risk management when lending money to small sellers (Amazon) or 
enabling optimal payments (Alipay74).  
                                                          
70
   Bernardo Nicoletti, The Future of FinTech: Integrating Finance and Technology in Financial Services 
(Springer, 2017) 268; Nav Athwal, ‘The Top Five Fintech Marketplaces’ Forbes, 25 September 2015, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/navathwal/2015/09/25/the-top-five-fintech-marketplaces/#5faf2a2a735c (last 
accessed 25 April 2017). 
71
  Examples include automatized customer relationship management tools (e.g. Squirro) or market sentiment 
analyst Amareos. 
72
   Puneet Sikka,How Facebook and other social networks monetize users’ data, Market Realist (26 September 
2014) http://marketrealist.com/2014/09/different-social-networks-making-use-users-data/ (last accessed 21 
April 2017). 
73
  This function has led to their description as ‘Financial Services Overlay Providers’ or ‘Financial over the top 
providers’. 
74
  See Janos Barberis, ‘From FinTech to TechFin: Data is the new Oil’, supra n. 3. 
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In the third and final stage, given the superiority of their data, one would expect some of these 
TechFins to move into offering financial services and thus move into stage three in which they 
will provide very stiff competition to incumbent banks and other regulated entities.75 
 
Figure 1: TechFin Stages of Development 
 
 
IBM Watson is an example of a tech firm providing its technology to financial services firms 
but at the same time accessing ever increasing amounts of data which can be used to enhance 
its own technology and analytics capabilities.76  
As a tech firm moves from having no involvement in financial services to stage one, or from 
stage one to stage two, the core issue from a regulator’s perspective is when the tech firm 
turns into a regulated financial institution, if not this would leave open risks of regulatory 
arbitrage and unfair competition. Some activities clearly attract regulation, such as when client 
funds are taken onto the institution’s own balance sheet, when discretion over client money is 
exercised, or when client assets are pooled. However, formal banking and financial services 
characteristics may materialise, generally speaking, rather late in the game. Most TechFins will 
reach the second stage before applying for any authorisation for some type of regulated activity; 
and depending on the jurisdiction, many may be providing credit or sophisticated payment 
services to individuals or to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), without having sought any 
authorisation; although the timing on when authorisation is sought varies widely77  
                                                          
75
  Tech platforms (i.e. Alibaba) are taking a similar approach to supermarkets allowing third party to sell 
financial services on their own platform. See, “Jack Ma’s Ant Financial to build an open marketplace for 
finance products”, Tech in Asia (29 March 2017), available at https://www.techinasia.com/ant-financial-to-
launch-caifu-hao (last accessed 9 April 2017). In the future we can expect them to monitor best sold products 
and replace them with a self-branded version, similarly to how discount supermarkets (or e-commerce) in 
Europe and US have replaced third parties best sellers with their own products.  
76
  See IBM Watson, Watson Financial Services,  https://www.ibm.com/watson/financial-services/ (last 
accessed 21 April 2017). 
77
  See examples supra, notes 4 to 13. 
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Most financial regulation attaches an authorisation requirement for intermediaries to access 
clients’ funds, either in a bank account or a security deposit.78 For instance, authorisation 
requirements for deposit-taking arise because client assets become those of the intermediary 
while the client receives in return an (unsecured) claim against the intermediary.  
Financial regulation also often attaches upon the solicitation of clients, marketing or arranging 
of financial services.79 In the TechFin world, however, clients often voluntarily contact the 
TechFin provider for certain services; and technically this may not be a solicitation, marketing 
or arranging, and thus fall outside financial regulatory authorisation requirements.80 This is 
because TechFins do not seek access to the client’s assets, but rather to the client’s data: from 
that, all else follows.  
For instance, a platform such as Facebook, Amazon or Alibaba functions as an access point for 
multiple clients to other businesses, some of which may be licensed (payment providers81, 
credit institutions), while others such as simple shops are not. This is one of the defining 
characteristics of TechFins: they derive their influence from access to data rather than 
money.82  
However, where TechFins do get direct access to client funds, such as through Alipay’s money 
market funds,83 they then will or at least should usually be subject to mandatory regulation. But 
even so, with the part of the business that must be licensed quarantined in a subsidiary of the 
Tech mother company, only a tiny fraction of the overall data set and algorithms will be subject 
to regulation and supervision. Accordingly, regulators will have access only to tiny portions of 
the conglomerate that generates the risks. 
Development from stage one to three could happen rather rapidly. For instance, Alipay 
introduced Yu’e Bao and its associated mobile application ‘Alipay Wallet’ in June 2013.84 
Yu’e Bao is essentially an online money market fund in which Alipay customers can invest 
money left in their Alipay accounts and earn interest at rates generally higher than those offered 
by banks.85 Yu’e Bao does not require minimum amounts to invest and allows withdrawals at 
                                                          
78
  [add sources from US, EU, ASIA, AUS*]. 
79
  [add sources from US, EU, ASIA, AUS*]. 
80
  From an accelerator standpoint, it was seen in practice how regulators have various understanding of social 
media platforms and how this works in context of cross-border marketing. If a US registered user shares on 
his/her Twitter and Facebook account an opportunity to register for a trading account but his/her friend base 
is international. Is this performing cross-border marketing? How can this be monitored? 
81
  For example, see Facebook lists of its payment licenses within 49 US states. See, “Money Transmitter 
Licence”, Facebook, available at: https://www.facebook.com/payments_terms/licenses (last accessed 9th 
April 2017)  
82
   Janos Barberis, ‘From fintech to techfin: data is the new oil’, supra n. 3. 
83
   Tracey Xiang, Alipay’s 10 Years: from Payment Service to Online Finance Pioneer, Technode (8 December 
2014) http://technode.com/2014/12/08/alipays-ten-years-from-payment-service-to-online-finance-pioneer/ 
(last accessed 21 April 2017); Alizila, Alipay Yu’e Bao is Largest Money Market Fund in China, 28 October 
2013 http://www.alizila.com/alipay-yue-bao-is-largest-money-market-fund-in-china/ (last accessed 21 April 
2017). 
84
   Jon Russell, China’s Alipay relaunches its e-payment app as Alipay Wallet with online-to-offline payments, 
The Next Web (18 January 2013)  https://thenextweb.com/asia/2013/01/18/alipay-wallet/#.tnw_439CO2Jv 
(last accessed 21 April 2017). 
85
 For a good introduction of Yu’e Bao, see Moran Zhang, “Alibaba’s Online Money Market Fund Yu’E Bao: 8 
Things You Need To Know”, International Business Times (11 March 2014), available at: 
http://www.ibtimes.com/alibabas-online-money-market-fund-yue-bao-8-things-you-need-know-1560601. 
The official website of Yu’E Bao is here: https://bao.alipay.com/yeb/index.htm (in Chinese). 
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any time.86 In addition, as up to 90 percent of Yu’e Bao funds are invested in interbank deposits 
at 29 large banks, including the big state-owned ones’, investment in Yu’e Bao is seen as low 
risk and secure.87 With these advantages compared to conventional financial products, Yu’e 
Bao quickly became China’s largest online money market fund88 and the fourth largest 
worldwide.89 After only one year, Yu’e Bao had 100 million investors and RMB 570 billion 
(or more than US$90 billion) of assets under management. Amounting to an average 
investment size per investor of only approximately US$900-1000, Yu’e Bao offers 
‘microinvestment’ on a very large scale.90 
Prior to becoming subject to regulation, TechFins often build a data-driven, international 
market presence, develop their network and gather an enormous amount of data. They may 
influence financial activity without yet being financial intermediaries by providing data to the 
intermediaries or by serving as the conduit between their existing customers and a financial 
services provider.91  
In addition to cultural differences between non-financial entrants into the financial sector, it is 
also the speed of these developments that provides a particular challenge for regulators. We 
return to this discussion in more detail in Part 3. 
 
OVER TIME THE DISTINCTION WILL DISAPPEAR  
At the moment there are stark differences between traditional financial institutions, FinTech 
startups and TechFins. However, over time, these differences will progressively diminish as 
the importance of data analytics in finance and financial institutions increases. For instance, 
large international banks may buy many more aggregated data sets from various sources than 
they do currently and factor this data into their business decisions in addition to seeking to 
better analyse and use their proprietary data. And some TechFins may ultimately apply for full 
banking and financial services licenses and become global financial conglomerates, in the 
manner of Ant Financial. Over time, we predict the terms FinTech and TechFin will fall out of 
use, and these activities will be known simply as ‘finance’ or ‘banking’. The analogy is with 
‘e-commerce’. Ten years ago buying products on-line was engaging in e-commerce, today, in 
many countries, it is simply shopping. 
We are concerned with what happens in the meantime – in the next 10 to 15 years – and with 
how regulators will respond to the massive challenges these changes will pose for them.    
                                                          
86
 Ibid. We note that these features may not be unique to Yu’e Bao. FinTechs in the field of money market funds 
offer services with similar characteristics. For instance Acorn (US) allow you to invest spare change by 
rounding up you card expenses, see “Acorns: The Company That's Changing The Way Millennials Invest”, 
Nasdaq (31 January 2017) available at: http://www.nasdaq.com/article/acorns-the-company-thats-changing-
the-way-millennials-invest-cm740620 (last accessed 8 April 2017) 
87
 Ibid.  
88
 Ibid.  
89
 Cf. Tjun Tang, Yue zhang, David He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China – New Drivers, New Game, New 
Strategy” (2014), available at: 
http://www.bcg.com.cn/en/files/publications/reports_pdf/BCG_The_Rise_of_Digital_Finance_in_China_Oc
t_2014.pdf (last accessed 6 April 2017), at 4.   
90
 Ibid.  
91
  As mentioned above (note 75), TechFin firms can also act as financial market place to understand most popular 
product / service, acquiring data and then deciding whether or not to provide this directly.  
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3. OPPORTUNITIES 
In addition to furthering innovation and competition generally,92 TechFins provide new 
opportunities, with at least three are worth considering in more detail. 
  
REDUCING TRANSACTION COSTS 
First, the technology and data underlying TechFins facilitate reduction of transaction costs. For 
financial institutions, the transaction costs for any given financial contract – checks on client 
background, determining the contract type, relying on and filling out the contract form, 
‘signature runs’ to get approval by authorized staff – are fixed costs per contract. If technology 
can assist in standardising and automating these procedures, after the initial investment in 
software and server set-up (which are sunk costs), transaction costs per additional contract will 
be very low. Under these conditions, financial institutions can process a large volume of 
contracts at very low cost.  
Reduction of transaction costs, however, is not unique to TechFins: this is the rationale for 
most FinTech innovation and for most kinds of IT.93 For instance, these are among the most 
important underlying rationales for the development of traditional interbank electronic 
payment systems as well as the argument in favour of distributed ledger technologies.94 
 
IMPROVED BUSINESS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Second, as data matters for business decisions, the big data approach applied by TechFins 
should improve business decisions. This is because TechFins’ data sets are typically of better 
quality than those of traditional financial institutions in two ways. First, the data sets are more 
comprehensive. Traditional banks see only the back-end of the business transactions – the 
cash flow processed over its bank accounts, accompanied by some (more or less correct) 
qualitative statements by the client on their projected income and expenses. The front-end 
comprises the client relationship, including customer product preferences, which other 
network participants contacted the client for which reasons, which contracts were entered into 
and terminated, and which goods were returned and why. All of this information, foreclosed to 
the traditional bank, is vital, as it enables a TechFin to form a far truer picture than can any 
bank, in close to real time, of the real financial position of the business to which they are 
considering extending credit or insurance or other financial services. The TechFin will know 
if certain cash represents a loan from another source or income from customer sales. The 
TechFin will know if the retailer or manufacturer enjoys low or high rates of product returns, 
and be able to infer to some extent from this whether its customers are happy and satisfied. 
                                                          
92
  The usefulness of competition cannot be stated per se, but must be assessed for each market separately in light 
of systemic risk concerns. While some markets (for instance Germany) are deemed ‘over-banked’ others could 
benefit from an enhanced level of competition. See on Australia:  D. Healey & R Nicholls, Enhancing 
Competition: Challenges for Australian Retail Banking, (2017) 28 JBFLP 48 (holding that an enhanced level 
of competition could further benefits for consumers). 
93
   Alan McQuinn, Weining Guo and Daniel Castro, Policy Principles for Fintech, Information Technology & 
Innovation Foundation (October 2016) http://www2.itif.org/2016-policy-principles-fintech.pdf. (last 
accessed 21 April 2017) 5. 
94
   Kim Kaivanto, ‘Risks and Transaction Costs of Distributed-Ledger Fintech: Boundary Effects and 
Consequences’ (2017) 2. 
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This access to data from the front-end relationship that TechFins often have with customers, 
gives TechFins a significant advantage over traditional financial institutions.  
Moreover, TechFins’ data sets may comprise a much larger section of society and the 
economy than that of traditional financial institutions. This is because TechFins have their 
origins from a place unrelated to financial services. They leverage data generated from social 
media and general economic activity into financial services to an extent unavailable to 
established financial institutions.  
For instance, correlations may indicate that people who buy a choker-chain for their dog are 
less creditworthy than those whose choice of dog lead indicates they own a more gentle animal; 
so credit premiums for the former may go up.  Or the purchase of door stoppers, to prevent 
one’s doors damaging one’s walls, may correlate with being house proud and slightly more 
credit worthy.95 Or a telecom provider derives credit scores from the use across time of 
telecommunication devices96 – and will unintentionally and probably unknowingly grant lower 
credit scores to Orthodox Jews who do not use their phones on Saturdays. 
It will be the challenge of the next decade to identify which correlations detected by the data 
analytics tools are random and which may function as an appropriate basis for prudent business 
decisions.97 Big data analytics are based on correlations rather than causations, but given that 
correlations hint at the underlying causations, these correlations provide the path for future 
research.98 
  
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Third, TechFins could facilitate financial inclusion by replacing the need, common in 
traditional banking, for inter-personal relations.99  
                                                          
95
  Example provided by Paul Schulte during the launch of his book “Next Revolution in Our Credit-Driven 
Economy: The Advent of Financial Technology”, Wiley & Sons 2015, on 4 Sept 2015. Event details 
available at: https://www.eventbrite.hk/e/fintech-book-launch-paul-schulte-on-fintech-tickets-
18178201490?aff=es2# (last accessed 9 April 2017). 
96
  See Olga Kharif, 'No credit history, no problem: Lenders now look at phone data' Australian Financial 
Review, 27 November 2016, available at: http://www.afr.com/technology/no-credit-history-no-problem-
lenders-now-look-at-phone-data-20161127-gsylwf (last accessed 19 April 2017); Davis Ntwiga, 'Credit 
Scoring for M-Shwari using Hidden Markov Model' (2016) 12(15) European Scientific Journal 176; Tamara 
Cook and Claudia McKay, How M-Shwari Works: The Story So Far (CGAP and FSD Kenya, 2015). 
97
  For example, Facebook has applied for a patent to use friend connection as a metric to derive 
creditworthiness for the purpose of loan origination by a bank. See, “Could a Bank Deny Your Loan Based 
on Your Facebook Friends?”, The Atlantic (25 September 2015) available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/facebooks-new-patent-and-digital-
redlining/407287/ (last accessed 8 April 2017). 
98
   Gil Press, ‘Big Data News Roundup: Correlation vs. Causation’ Forbes, 19 April 2013, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/04/19/big-data-news-roundup-correlation-vs-
causation/#68ca6bab5db4 (last accessed 21 April 2017); Ben Rossi, Causation and correlation: a big (data) 
headache, 3 December 2015) http://www.information-age.com/causation-and-correlation-big-data-
headache-123460611/ (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
99
  See Susan Wolfe, Banks Seek Balance of Interpersonal Relationships, Online Convenience, Mintel (20 May 
2014) http://www.mintel.com/blog/finance-market-news/banks-seek-balance-of-interpersonal-relationships-
online-convenience (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
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SME and Consumer Loans 
In the past, relationship banking was characterised by a large level of personal trust deriving 
from a long-standing business relationship between the bank and its clients.100 In big data 
terms, the relationship banker located at a branch collected an enormous amount of data points 
on its clients based on multiple transactions and information gathered (discussions, business 
lunches, referrals from other clients, etc). These data points were collected, however, in an 
unsystematic, erratic way and much stayed with the individual banker. Today, for small clients, 
relationship banking has been replaced by the ‘rule of the quants’. The costs of traditional 
relationship banking have become too high for small clients. Institutions can either transfer 
these costs to clients (by asking them to pay fees) or internalise them. Yet retail clients are 
reluctant to pay fees, and banks are very reluctant to undertake unprofitable business. The result 
is that institutions stop offering services to small clients. Financial institutions focus 
relationship services on large clients with either large volumes or sizes of transactions and large 
portfolios. Small businesses and consumers are left with either standardised services, without 
personal support and advice, or excluded altogether from financial services. 
The origins of this development towards one-size-fits-all financial services for individual 
clients are twofold: transaction costs and risk. As outlined above, both transaction costs and 
risk will be driven down by TechFins. In particular, the costs for an automated contract are 
more or less the same regardless of volume. Once automated (and in the absence of costly 
regulation), it will be the risks associated with the transaction which determine intermediaries’ 
business strategies and decisions.  
On the risk side, the big data approach should also drive change. For instance, the general 
assumption (embedded for instance in the Basel III framework)101 is that lending to small firms 
is high risk.102 While small firms employ most people in most economies, generally speaking 
small firms are more likely to fail given a lack of an equity cushion and little interest from both 
business partners and the state in keeping the firm alive in troubled times. We may also see a 
lack of professionalism in management. In turn, we have seen credit extension to small firms 
reduced to low levels,103 promoting regulatory responses in some countries.104 In a similar vein, 
                                                          
100
  RP Buckley, "The Changing Nature of Banking and Why It Matters", in Buckley, Avgouleas & Arner (eds), 
Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 9-27. 
101
  See Bank of International Settlement, Basel III: international regulatory framework for banks, available at: 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last accessed 7 April 2017). 
102
  See, eg, Small- and medium-sized enterprises (7 December 2014) Financial System Inquiry, 
http://fsi.gov.au/publications/interim-report/03-funding/small-med-enterprises/ (last accessed 25 April 
2017).  
103
  See European Banking Authority (EBA), Report on SMEs and SME Supporting Factor, EBA/OP/2016/04, 23 
March 2016, at p. 66, available at: https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1359456/EBA-Op-2016-
04++Report+on+SMEs+and+SME+supporting+factor.pdf (last accessed 7 April 2017) (stating that 
‘Following the financial crisis, SME bank lending has suffered a significant backdrop in volume, from a peak 
of EUR 95 billion in mid-2008 to approximately EUR 54 billion in 2013/2014’). [SOURCES for US, AUS, 
ASIA?*]. 
104
  European legislature added to the European legislation implementing Basel III, the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013, a SME Supporting Factor, by introducing a deduction in capital requirements 
for exposures to SMEs by applying the SME SF of 0.7619 to capital requirements calculated under the Basel 
III accord. See on the SF impact European Banking Authority (EBA), Report on SMEs and SME Supporting 
Factor, EBA/OP/2016/04, 23 March 2016, available at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1359456/EBA-Op-2016-
04++Report+on+SMEs+and+SME+supporting+factor.pdf (last accessed 7 April 2017). 
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credit to consumers is restricted based on rough broad categories. For instance, retirees may 
have difficulties getting loans, given that many banks impose age caps on certain loans.105   
Based on better data sets and data analytics as described above, TechFins may be able to better 
adjust credit rates to the risk (i.e. the client) at hand, and ‘re-personalise’ the financial 
relationship via algorithms. Data-based finance could be simultaneously more personal and 
more inclusive: more attuned to individuals’ real risk profiles (if the data-based methodology 
is sound, which of course is a sizable ‘if’), and more inclusive as it could affordably provide 
‘personalised’ financial services at a much lower cost per client.106 
This rationale of big data finance underlies Amazon’s lending programme to small business 
sellers and Alipay’s consumer loan offerings.107 We assume that, as with most TechFin 
businesses, Amazon and Alipay are pursuing a trial and error approach, training their 
algorithms ‘on the job’ rather than looking for a perfect first time approach.108 While this 
approach facilitates change, it also provides reason for concern. We discuss this further in Part 
4.    
Developing countries 
Both aspects discussed above – lower transaction costs and better access to risk-related data – 
also explain the remarkable tech-based financial inclusion prompted by TechFins in developing 
countries, such as through M-PESA and M-KESHO.109 While the details are beyond the focus 
of this paper,110 we note that technology tried and proven in an environment of (more or less) 
                                                          
105
  See http://www.news.com.au/finance/older-australians-into-their-eighties-approved-for-home-loans/news-
story/9fd4e014da30760dc3a93916e58aca75  (citing RateCity’s database stating that the number of lenders 
with no maximum age restriction has fallen from 88 per cent last year to 76 per cent this year, and citing the 
Australian Bankers’ Association’s chief executive officer Steven Munchenberg emphasizing responsibility 
lending restrictions apply before approving loans to customers to ensure they can meet repayments, with 
serviceability being a key consideration); some mortgage specialists require that debtors can repay the loan 
before your retirement age, see http://www.guarantorhomeloan.com.au/lending-guidelines/ (last accessed 7 
April 2017); Lorna Bourke, ‘Too old for a mortgage’, CityWire Asia, 9 June 2010, 
http://citywireasia.com/news/too-old-for-a-mortgage/a403797?section=money (last accessed 20 April 2017) 
contra some mortgage lenders in the United Kingdom and United States: Esther Shaw, ‘Mortgage lenders lift 
upper limits to help solve an age-old problem’ The Guardian, 17 October 2016, 
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accessed 20 April 2017); Marcie Geffner, ‘You’re never too old for a mortgage’ Bankrate, 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/mortgages/never-old-mortgage-1.aspx (last accessed 20 April 2017).  
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in algorithm. Regulators would consider this a concentration risk and may require higher capital to be set 
aside to reflect the non-diversify nature of the loan-book.  
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   Nandita Bose, ‘Amazon is going to start offering business loans to seller in China’, Thomson Reuters, 29 
June 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-exclusive-amazon-to-offer-loans-to-sellers-in-china-7-other-
countries-2015-6?IR=T (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
108
  For example Amazon has stopped after only 6 weeks of operation its loan program targeting students. See, 
“Amazon and Wells Fargo Terminate Student Loan Partnership” Bloomberg (1 Sept 2016), available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-31/amazon-and-wells-fargo-terminate-student-loan-
partnership (last accessed 9 April 2017). 
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   See African Development Bank Group, Financial Inclusion and Integration through Mobilr Payments and 
Transfer (March 2012) ; Financial Access Initiative, M-KESHO in Kenya: A new step for M-PESA and 
mobile banking (27 May 2010) http://www.financialaccess.org/blog/2015/7/16/m-kesho-in-kenya-a-new-
step-for-m-pesa-and-mobile-banking (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
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  Cf. RP Buckley and S Webster, “FinTech in Developing Countries: Charting New Customer Journeys”, Vol 
44 Journal of Financial Transformation, 151-159; J Greenacre, RP Buckley and L Malady, “The Regulation 
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weak public institutions should also work in Western countries. Examples include the pure 
mobile phone-based M-PESA operations offered in societies where a large share of the 
population cannot read and write.111 While we note that the costs of these services reflect the 
less-competitive environment in which they operate, by advancing financial inclusion these 
TechFins provide a valuable contribution by allowing a far broader range of people to enjoy 
the benefits of access to financial services.  
 
  
                                                          
of Mobile Money: A Case Study of Malawi", (2015) 14 Global Studies Law Review, 435-497.  DA Zetzsche, 
RW Buckley & DW Arner, “Digital Inclusive Finance” (forthcoming 2017). 
111
  Janet Kamana, M-PESA: How Kenya took the lead in mobile money, Mobile Transaction (7 April 2014) 
https://www.mobiletransaction.org/m-pesa-kenya-the-lead-in-mobile-money/ (last accessed 21 April 2017). 
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4. FINANCIAL LAW AND REGULATION CHALLENGES 
As a result of their continuing evolution, TechFins create a number of challenges for society 
and regulators alike. The impact of artificial intelligence and data analytics on individuals and 
the financial system is uncertain and, from a financial regulatory perspective, a potential source 
of risk. 
 
SYSTEMIC ISSUES 
False Predictions 
Data correlations, if not tested for causation, raise the risk of false predictions.112 If the 
algorithm is wrong at a systematic level113 the data advantage of TechFin firms may be at risk. 
Furthermore, as soon as the TechFin firm has reached a certain size, the insolvency of the 
TechFin may impair firms linked to it. For instance, if a TechFin provides the website that links 
its customers to an authorised financial services provider, the bank or financial services firm’s 
prospects may be simultaneously adversely affected with those of the TechFin. 
If TechFins were licensed, regulators would seek to mitigate infection risks. The systemic 
dimension of algorithms is covered by what financial lawyers refer to as ‘model risk’.114 
Financial regulation asks the licensed entity to review its models regularly and justify model 
assumptions unique to the authorised firm vis-à-vis the regulator.115 Futhermore, if TechFins 
were licensed, regulators would require diversification in order to undo concentration risk. This 
would counter, for instance, a business model focusing on servicing only very narrowly 
selection parts of society. While the regulation would not be foolproof, some safeguards are 
installed; so that at least in times of crisis, regulators have some idea as to the origin and 
underlying activity of the regulated entity.  
Protected Factors 
TechFins should be held to similar standards to licensed entities to avoid discriminatory 
practices towards the public. Indeed, within the financial services industry, the law often 
protects certain values by disallowing discrimination based on certain factors, which we term 
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  Hector Zenil, Algorithmic Data Analytics, Small Data Matters and Correlation Versus Causation, Cornell 
University Library, (5 September 2013) 16. 
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  Cf. Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. 
Robinson & Harlan Yu, “Accountable Algorithms”, 165 U Pa. L. Rev. 633, 683 (2017) (analysing 
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  Ignacio Crespo, Pankaj Kumar, Peter Noteboom and Marc Taymans, The evolution of model risk 
management, McKinsey & Company (February 2017) http://www.mckinsey.com/business-
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protected factors.116 Yet the efficiency of these stipulations may be threatened by data analytics. 
For instance, if data analytics show a certain race or gender generally has a better credit score, 
that better score could derive from existing biases against other races or genders. There are also 
studies arguing that analytics-based booking systems discriminate on the basis of race or other 
protected factors.117 Algorithms can certainly discriminate wrongfully against certain groups 
of people.118  
Combining this data lead discrimination with automation decision ‘may simultaneously 
systematize and conceal discrimination.’119 The more data analytics substitute for human 
judgement, the more important it will be to shield protected factors from abuse and enforce 
anti-discrimination laws, in order to avoid a new type of racial or other profiling which could 
result in denial of credit and services for certain demographics.120 
While banking and discrimination based on income and wealth go hand in hand, regulators 
have imposed safeguards to ensure that protected factors are upheld. For instance, in some 
jurisdictions financial institutions must provide an affordable payments account; in others the 
institutions are required to serve all parts of society. The way in which protected factors are 
enforced varies from country to country. However, most efforts attach these duties to entities 
which meet the traditional definition of a financial services provider – which TechFins will 
typically only do in the latter stages of their development (discussed above in Part 2) – and 
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  The US federal law provides for two fair lending statutes, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 
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Comptroller’s Licensing Manual (September 2016), Appendix E, at p. 99, available at: 
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf (‘The ECOA 
prohibits discrimination in any part of a credit transaction. The ECOA applies to any extension of credit, 
including extensions of credit to persons, small businesses, corporations, partnerships, and trusts. The Fair 
Housing Act applies to residential real estate-related transactions. Both of these acts prohibit discrimination 
based on race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin. The ECOA also prohibits discrimination based on 
gender, marital status, receipt of public assistance, or the exercise of a right under the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act. The Fair Housing Act also prohibits discrimination based on disability or familial status. 
Generally, discrimination in a credit transaction against persons because they are (or are not) members of a 
group previously categorized violates the ECOA and, if the transaction is related to residential real estate, 
violates the Fair Housing Act.’). [Examples EU, ASIA, AUS*] 
117
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most of these efforts limit discriminatory decisions taken by individuals – their applicability to 
the unforeseen consequences of algorithms and machine learning is as yet very unclear. 
  
REAL POWER, UNREAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Denial of Services 
TechFin also makes an impact at the individual level. For instance, let us assume that in fact 
the people that buy a choker chain (in the example above) do not intend to use it for their own 
dog but give it as a gift to another. Using the chain as a proxy would result in incorrect pricing 
of credit or insurance. Algorithms can of course be much more sophisticated. For instance, 
algorithms may also consider whether the same customer purchases dog food and sanitary 
articles for dogs and is shown on pictures uploaded on social media with dogs as the basis for 
the conclusion that this purchaser warrants a higher cost of credit or insurance premium.  
However, this example could be easily turned around. Let us assume that the housemaid is in 
charge of purchasing items for the dog, and likes to display pictures of herself walking the dog. 
The maid would be penalised by the higher premium while the dog owner would not. While 
on a system-wide basis these statistical outliers will be evened out – there are not many people 
employing housemaids that use their personal account for job-related shopping – the credit and 
insurance pricing for those individuals who do will be inaccurate. This is a somewhat trivial 
example, but it is easy to imagine more severe interference with human lives, perhaps resulting 
in the denial of credit and service.  
Further, we may see non-users suffer from financial and other forms of exclusion. This also 
means that in a data-driven world, opting to not share personal data may make you de facto a 
second class, digital, citizen: Because the best products, prices and opportunities will only be 
provided to the one consenting to share their data with the predictive algorithm of the TechFin. 
If big data applications are used for background checks, the front-end interactions could rectify 
the problem. If big data is used at the front-end, however, rectification will be unavailable given 
the data-driven approach of the TechFin business model: the factors considered for calculating 
the premium will not be revealed and there will be no one to whom clients can turn for a 
remedy. TechFins could accordingly substantially impact people and yet bear little 
responsibility for that impact, and with little recourse available to customers. 
If TechFins were licensed, these problems would be mitigated. The impact of business 
decisions on clients is covered by a multitude of customer, client and investor protection laws 
which require, at least, (a) transparency of terms, and (b) a contact point for recourse and 
customer complaints.121 And last, but not least, a regulator will be standing ready to step in.122 
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While these solutions are far from perfect, financial regulation can provide some safeguards, 
particularly for vulnerable consumers. 
 
Pay for Display 
Given that TechFins may dominate the front-end customer relationship and their marketing-
fee driven business models, ‘pay for display’ schemes often predominate rather than selection 
of services or products for display based on quality or price. For instance, in many countries, 
the paid announcements in Google’s search function dominate the top positions. We can expect 
that similar priorities exist in other TechFin models apparently provided for free to customers, 
although in fact these customers pay by providing access to themselves and data about them, 
to commercial firms. Linking this tech-based strategy with financial services creates serious 
concerns for consumer choice and market efficiency.  
For instance, imagine a TechFin presenting its investment fund selection based on the fees the 
fund pays to the TechFin rather than on merits or customer demand (as determined by big data 
analytics) or of social media data being used to target less educated and financially savvy 
people for high-cost predatory loans and risky financial products.123 Financial regulation is 
designed to mitigate those abuses. For instance, the issues associated with shelf fees for mutual 
funds in the US are well known and have prompted regulatory responses including mandatory 
disclosure and outright bans,124 while in the EU financial services firms must disclose whether 
their preselection of financial products is independent and neutral (or dependent and potentially 
biased by kickbacks paid from third parties).125 Fees received by the investment firms must not 
impair compliance with the investment firm’s duty to act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of its clients.126 As to predatory lending, financial law often 
imposes fair lending policies, and charges regulators with enforcing these duties against 
lenders.127 While, again, this financial regulation is not perfect, it does at least seek to counter 
misbehaviour. None of this occurs as yet in the world of unlicensed tech firms.  
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Fiduciary Status 
The conceptual legal question of to whom TechFins owe duties matters. Financial law assigns 
to financial advisers, asset and fund managers the status of a fiduciary, which means all their 
business activities must be aligned with the interests of their clients.128 Similar safeguards will 
typically be missing for customers, clients and investors when dealing with TechFins in their 
early stages of development – as at this stage TechFins often only supply data or function 
merely as conduit between the supply (i.e. financial institutions) and the demand side. 
Whether the institution is subject to fiduciary obligations matters. To the same extent that 
TechFins may tailor products to the customer’s needs, data-driven micro-segmentation could 
unlock income-generating insights drawing on customer weaknesses. For instance, TechFins 
can adjust prices upward for customers insensitive to price, or unwilling to switch products and 
providers, respectively. While exploitation of brand loyalty, inertia or ability and willingness 
to pay more would violate financial law requirements to treat customers fairly, honestly and in 
a non-discriminatory manner,129 the inapplicability of financial law grants TechFins 
undesirable opportunities. 
 
SOME MORE ISSUES 
The list of potentially troublesome issues above is not comprehensive. For instance, given the 
network effects and economies of scale of both information and software markets that underpin 
TechFins, oligopoly risk is significant, and requires an antitrust/competition law response. 
This is because the quality of algorithms fuelled by data, and access to that data (not the 
financial licence and its related minimum capital and legal requirements) will operate as the 
barrier to entry.  
Another issue not addressed here relates to the taxation of TechFins. Where are TechFin 
services to be subject to tax? In addition to traditional tax criteria such as head office location, 
people employed and productive operations, alternatives include the location of (1) servers, (2) 
software design, (3) software programming (code writing), (4) clients whose data are gathered, 
and (5) clients targeted by TechFin algorithms. Further issues stem from data protection: Who 
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owns the data?130 Is there a ‘right to be forgotten’,131 and if so, who can enforce this right and 
where can it be enforced? We also see issues of contract law and private international and civil 
procedure law: what type of contracts will users and TechFins engage in, which country’s laws 
(i.e. which minimum consumer protection standards) will apply, which courts will have 
jurisdiction, and how will clients’ recourse be ensured?  
Finally, the data points on a person create a fully commercialised digital identity.132 Who owns 
the property rights in this identity? Is there a right to provide access to one’s digital identity to 
other service providers?   
Since this paper focuses on financial regulation (at the conjunction of financial regulation and 
data management), these questions are left for further research. Suffice it to say, however, that 
as regulators learn more about the activities of TechFins, they will be able to better respond to 
the above challenges, and they will learn even more if TechFins are regulated, at the minimum 
initially by the imposition of reporting requirements. 
 
WHY DO WE CARE 
To make a long story short: while financial regulation may address several shortcomings 
arising from improper use of financial data, TechFins in their early stages of development will 
often be outside the scope of this regulation. For instance, existing financial laws may provide 
for exemptions for SME lending on which TechFins could rely. Further, functioning as a mere 
conduit (‘a web page’) between clients and financial institutions does not submit the conduit 
to the laws applicable to financial institutions, even if the institution comes to depend upon the 
conduit and the collapse of the latter may imperil the former.  
Although TechFins control access to clients they are not subject to the ‘solicitation’, 
‘marketing’ or ‘arranging’ rules originally written for those who control access to clients. 
Further, data delivery to financial institutions is a regulated activity only in some countries, 
and even there only under strictly defined conditions, typically limited to rating agencies and 
market data providers.133  In turn, the shortcomings of TechFin activity may well not be 
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addressed, which will leave clients, investors and potentially significant participants in the 
financial system exposed to the impact and risk of unregulated big data analytics. 
Financial intermediaries should be experts in processing financial information so as to channel 
cash flows to their most efficient use, in terms of expected risk-return ratios. This is challenged 
by TechFins. If TechFins have better data than traditional financial institutions, TechFins may 
provide the financial intermediary function more effectively. However, TechFins, at least 
today, operate for the most part in an unregulated environment. Until the third stage when they 
adopt financial services licenses (as discussed above in Part 2), TechFins are neither subject to 
client/customer/investor protection rules nor subject to measures that ensure the functioning of 
financial markets and prevent the build-up of systemic risk – these being the three pillars of 
modern financial regulation.134  
Moreover, from the perspective of licensed intermediaries, TechFins provide unbalanced, and 
arguably unfair, competition. The fixed costs of an initial license and the ongoing costs of 
supervision and related reviews by accountants etc., will mean licensed intermediaries bear 
higher costs than unlicensed ones. In the long run, licensed intermediaries are doomed to lose 
in such contest, given their higher cost-base and limited flexibility to respond to competitive 
challenges. 
There are three ways to respond. First, we can remove some or all parts of regulation for 
financial institutions. While there are some aspects of regulation which may be overly 
burdensome and hinder innovation and arguably should be removed,135 it is not the purpose of 
this paper to analyse each and every rule imposed by financial regulation. Moreover, de-
regulation would not solve the underlying problem as long as some regulation remains for 
financial institutions and in light of the experience of the Global Financial Crisis, that some 
regulation will remain is, even on the most extreme view, a very likely outcome.  
Second, we could consider combining the strengths of financial institutions and TechFins. 
Potential solutions include that (1) authorized institutions could rely on TechFin data in 
addition to their own (insourcing rules), and (2) TechFins could be allowed to acquire licensed 
institutions (merger model). However, in the absence of proper regulation, TechFins are 
unlikely to forego opportunities. As to solution (1), authorised institutions cannot be sure that 
they will get all, or, in particular, the most valuable, data. As to solution (2), if TechFins are 
seriously interested in buying authorized entities, depending on the laws of the individual 
jurisdiction concerned, they may be able to do so, but for the most part they have so far 
refrained from such acquisitions, perhaps due to legacy issues and (more likely) the negative 
impact of regulation on their business model.  
Third, we could analyse in detail where TechFins threaten the fundamentals of financial 
regulation and ensure that these are safeguarded by some regulatory response to TechFins. This 
is what we pursue in the remainder of this paper. 
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Difference to FinTech? 
From a regulatory point of view to what extent do TechFins differ from FinTechs? We have 
seen FinTechs seeking regulatory niches. For instance, crowdlending has relied on the peer-to-
peer lending exemption in many European countries,136 while German crowdfunding 
platforms, in the beginning, utilized the fact that certain debt contracts were not deemed 
‘securities’ or ‘deposits’ under German law.137  
TechFins and most FinTechs share the propensity to avoid the regulatory system as long as 
they can,138 something they have in common with traditional financial sector participants as 
well, as witnessed in the context of ‘shadow banking’ and regulatory arbitrage to minimise 
regulatory constraints and costs. TechFins and FinTechs are different animals, however. In 
particular, we see two main differences between TechFins and FinTechs in terms of the 
client/investor and systemic risk dimensions of regulation discussed above.  
First, as to the client protection dimension of financial regulation: the first and foremost asset 
of financial services providers is their clients’ trust. Without trust, clients will not place their 
money with the provider.139 TechFins start with the client relationship and then add the 
financial dimension. TechFins create trust in a world unrelated to financial services and 
leverage this trust in the financial sphere. Due to the trust created in a non-financial setting, 
clients may be less cautious when exposed to the TechFin’s additional financial services. The 
fact that a client has experience with the technology or e-commerce services of a TechFin and 
is comfortable with these provides the basis for the transition into financial services.140 Even 
more so, due to the TechFin’s grip on its client data, the TechFin may select clients on the basis 
of loyalty and comfort with data-driven contact, and build their business from there.  
Second, as to the systemic risk dimension: size creates systemic risk.141 FinTechs as problem-
driven firms, and though trying to become big, tend to start small.142 As such, indirect 
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regulation by licensed entities may suffice to address systemic risks.143 In contrast, TechFins 
are often very significant firms outside of financial services prior to stepping into the financial 
sector. Due to their sheer size TechFins are connected to many institutions from the moment 
they engage in stage 1, such as when the TechFin functions as a conduit to licensed institutions. 
Moreover, due to their data power, TechFins exercise influence over connected financial 
institutions from the moment they engage in stage 1, and often tend to control whole market 
segments when entering stage 3. 
The result of trust and control over important market participants in financial services being in 
the hands of the few has led to major financial crises. As examples, we point to the early-2000s 
accounting frauds144 and the infamous role of rating agencies145 and systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) in the Global Financial Crisis.146 Note that accounting firms and 
rating agencies are mere data providers linked to the system (like TechFins in stage 1), while 
SIFIs are typically very large (like TechFins in their stage 3).147 Both types are strictly regulated 
today.148 The more TechFins move into financial services, the more it will be necessary to 
consider how to protect society from their failures –in terms of service quality or financial 
stability.  
 
5. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Many businesses today do not want to be financial institutions because of the associated 
regulatory burdens,149 but do want to tap into their profits. Put simply, in the present common 
regulatory environment, Techfins often will not ‘pay’ for the concerns and risks they generate. 
They will not suffer from reduced business space within which to operate, nor have to pay 
regulatory fees, and, frankly, will often also manage to avoid national taxes. Nonetheless, 
TechFins may increasingly aim to take the most attractive and easily accessible portions of 
financial services business. Our concern is not for the banks’ well-being; as market actors they 
need to face market realities and adapt to competition provided by technology. However, if the 
competition from these unregulated entities destabilizes the regulated financial institutions, the 
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rise of TechFins may well reduce client protection and promote systemic risks. This is our 
concern.  
 
COSTS OF DOING NOTHING 
We have already defined as a core issue that TechFins in their early stages do not meet the 
definition of financial activity, or it is unclear whether they are financial institutions as opposed 
to mere data providers. 
If we do nothing, the uneven playing field will persist – authorised intermediaries will lose 
business, the level of compliance will be gradually undermined, and the role of enforcement 
agencies will be weakened as their mandates will be too narrow. Potential systemic risk may 
build up unobserved, unmitigated and uncontrolled, and, looking longer-term, the next global 
financial crisis may well come from TechFins rather than authorised financial institutions.  
This poses a significant risk to society. There is already some evidence for the systemic 
dimension of TechFins. For instance, in ten months Yu’e bao became the fourth largest money 
market fund in the world, leading to a hasty response from Chinese regulators.150 When 
Amazon’s cloud computing data centre in Hong Kong failed, the website of the US SEC, plus 
many consumer oriented services, such as NetFlix, went down.151 And we can safely assume 
the systemic importance of Amazon and Alibaba in their SME niche markets and M-PESA for 
consumers in some African countries,152 so that the TechFins existence is a precondition for 
the well-being of many individuals and enterprises in those countries. 
One could respond that the early stage TechFin conduit function is merely one of data delivery; 
and data delivery is not a special activity warranting regulation. Yet data provision in a highly 
concentrated market has prompted regulators to require financial institutions to diversify their 
data sources. The difference with TechFin is that data delivery is a back-end function, while 
TechFins also provide front-end, overlay services to the financial institutions (as discussed 
above in Part 2). TechFins’ conduit function cannot be addressed by diversification 
requirements since the financial institution cannot readily change the ‘service provider’ as it 
can a back-end relationship – terminating the cooperation with the TechFin would cost the 
financial institution the link to its most precious asset: its clients. 
 
COSTS OF CATCH-ALL MANDATORY LICENSING 
On the other hand, catch-all mandatory licensing for data analytics is likely to stifle innovation. 
We have highlighted the potential social benefits of TechFin. TechFin has the ability to fill 
gaps in financial services provision, such as Ant Financial’s targeting of Tier 2 cities and the 
provision of SME finance, an area in which the traditional Chinese financial services industry 
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has performed poorly and in fact one of the motivations for initially light touch regulation of 
TechFin activities in China,153 so regulators would be ill-advised to interfere too early. 
 
OTHER REGULATORY OPTIONS 
Stretching Existing Definitions 
We could make rules made for the analogue era fit by stretching existing definitions, such as 
‘solicitation’, ‘marketing’ and ‘arranging’. Regulators pursuing this path, however, will face 
protracted court cases. They may win some cases, but uncertainty will prevail for years. 
Moreover, a general stretching of definitions may prove overly burdensome for innovative 
firms and stifle innovation. For instance, if we re-read ‘solicitation’ etc. to include websites, 
regulation could extend to include all website providers. In turn, to the extent we discuss 
stretching definitions we would need to discuss exemptions as otherwise enforcements will be 
impossible (too many to supervise) or powerless. However, the established reference 
mechanisms for carve outs (assets on the balance sheets or under management etc.) do not fit, 
so an entirely new approach would be required to tackle TechFin issues. 
A variant of this approach lies in delegation rules. This hints at the core of the underlying 
problem which is that the legal nature of the relationship between conduit (TechFin) and 
intermediary is uncertain. If it was a service agreement, delegation rules could apply and 
indirect supervision presents itself as solution. However, in a delegation relationship the control 
is (and should be) vested in the delegating entity rather than the delegate. As such the rules on 
delegation would seem unfit to deal with TechFins where the control often lies in the delegate. 
Private Law Alternatives 
As a private law alternative we could consider imposing joint liability for damages on the back-
end financial institution and the TechFin at the front-end. This is similarly insufficient. First, 
private law disregards the systemic risk dimension. Second, the segments of society financial 
law seeks to protect are particularly vulnerable, but non-litigious: the poor rarely sue. 
Moreover, in the absence of additional legislation plaintiffs face significant challenges in court, 
given the difficulties of gathering evidence and the costs of civil procedure. If we legislate, 
however, we best get it right. 
Open Data Policy? 
Proponents of open data could suggest that one way of dealing with TechFins is to reduce the 
value of data by providing access to the data to everyone, so that all entities could build 
algorithms. However, this solves only one side of the problem: data access. The algorithms 
used may well be profoundly misleading and harm protected factors. Next, the creation of an 
open data world itself runs into legal barriers such as data protection issues and will, if it ever 
happens, take years.  
Fight Fire with Fire: Independent Data Banks 
Another market based solution is reliance on Data Banks. These would act as data repository 
that are controlled by end users instead of the FinTech or the TechFin. This would support the 
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current move towards data sovereignty and digital identity. The user would grant various access 
rights of their data depending on products or service sought. The selected provider would then 
adjust their offer and service combined the user’s issued data and the proprietary algorithm of 
the firm. The customer could then better compare providers and which products & services is 
the most competitive. However, this model still suffers from initial data collection and 
certification as well as differentiation between data ownership and control. Additionally, the 
market price for raw data creates little economic incentives for customer to care about data 
sovereignty. Finally, the reprivatisation of data which is underlying this concept requires a 
cross-border data access regime which will require years of coordination among regulators 
across the globe which is unlikely to come in the next decade with which we are concerned. 
 
A BALANCED RISK ANALYSIS 
We thus argue in favour of a moderate regulatory intervention. 
A balanced risk analysis follows the evolution of any business from (1) too small to care, to 
(2) too large to ignore and then to (3) too big to fail (TBTF).154 As TechFins often do not seek 
access to client funds directly, many established financial regulatory thresholds will fail to be 
triggered. Yet TechFins can be much more influential than they would seem. In order to set 
appropriate thresholds, regulators must develop new criteria. These could include an overall 
number of data points, or holding data on a significant share of a population in the reference 
market, as both figures reflect a substantial data set.  
From there, traditional risk analysis would look at both the systemic and client perspectives. 
Systemic risk measures should apply as soon as TechFins become essential to financial 
stability. Whether this is the case depends on the TBTF or too complex to fail (TCTF) tests. If 
a TechFin is an essential facility for one important bank (e.g., it is its main data analytics 
provider), we could apply an infrastructure analogy and require diversification of data delivery 
channels. This is, however, old news, given the analogies provided by rating service agencies. 
If the TechFin is, however, the main client channel for one important bank or for many banks 
which together are of systemic importance, we would rather compare the TechFin to the 
importance of a new CEO and a new business model rather than infrastructure. To the same 
extent that a new bank CEO and other key staff would be subject to regulatory scrutiny, we 
would ask the TechFin to meet the ‘fit and proper’ requirement, and ask for adequate resources 
to maintain that function on the side of the TechFin. This is where the systemic risk perspective 
indicates a case for regulation of TechFin. 
The need for regulation is confirmed when looking at the customer/client/investor protection 
dimension: if TechFins can impact individuals, regulators should care. However, regulation 
cannot correct all faults in a society – it can only focus on the important ones. Thus, once the 
impact of the TechFin passes a certain threshold, regulators should step in in order to ensure 
appropriate gathering and processing of client data. 
 
TOWARDS A MIDDLE GROUND 
Licensing Requirement for Data Gathering and Analytics 
It follows from the above that regulators should require authorisation for data gathering and 
analytics when used for financial services, either directly as a financial services provider or 
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indirectly as a conduit for data delivery or access to customers. This policy proposal is subject 
to some qualifications.   
We recommend first to impose information rights for regulators linked to data gathering 
and analytics only. In order to support enforcement, the TechFin should be asked to declare 
its jurisdictional scope by reporting on (a) its data gathering, (b) the location of its clients 
and (c) its data delivery (if any) to intermediaries upon market entry as well as periodically 
thereafter. If a TechFin refuses to cooperate by disclosing its jurisdictional scope, regulators 
could enforce their laws by imposing a variant of geoblocking, which is ‘datablocking’ (i.e. no 
data from that jurisdiction may be used).  
In order to exempt most insignificant business, in terms of data gathering and data analytics, a 
generous exemption threshold is in order. For instance, if a deep data analysis on a single 
person amounts to 25,000 data points,155 a company that processes the data of 400,000 people 
in a deep fashion (i.e. manages 10 billion data points) in one market may be unlikely to generate 
systemic risk (unless the market is tiny). So ‘ordinary’ firms could be given the choice of 
generating and analyzing fewer client specific data points for more than 400,000 clients, or 
over 25,000 data points on correspondingly fewer than 400,000 clients. This threshold should 
exclude almost all non-data businesses, although obviously this is only an example and these 
figures would have to be adjusted to market size.156 
Once the TechFin reaches a certain size that indicates it is reaching the ‘too large to ignore’ 
threshold, regulators should have access to the TechFin’s data-based business models and 
algorithms in order to ensure sound methods and adherence to protected factors relevant to that 
reference market. For instance, regulators should be empowered to require data analytics to 
demonstrate process regularity, including the upholding of protected factors, and to review the 
specifications underlying the algorithms as well as the commitments embedded in its code.157 
In addition to enforcing fair treatment and protected factors for TechFins above this threshold, 
the review requirement will assist in reducing undue processes in sub-threshold TechFins. In 
light of the expectation that successful firms will be subject to a process regularity review, 
venture capitalists and other institutional investors will require evidence for process regularity 
prior to financing TechFins.  
Once regulators come to the conclusion that the TechFin is of systemic importance, for 
instance since TechFin data is essential for a systemically significant financial institution, or 
the TechFin provides the main client access for several financial institutions which together 
are of systemic significance, we recommend measures to control and limit systemic risk. In the 
first case this could require the significant financial institution to diversify its data sources. In 
the second case we recommend (a) structural requirements for TechFins (quarantine provisions 
as to ‘Fin’ with respect to entity, IT, capital; minimum capital for maintenance and clean-up; 
and country-by-country segregation of activities) and (b) empowering regulators to shut down 
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  Note that this figure is taken arbitrarily. It is inspired by Jack Ma’s statement on how much data Alibaba 
generates on one single customer. The real number may be higher or lower, respectively. The figures in our 
example be adjusted accordingly. 
156
  For instance, thresholds appropriate for tiny Luxembourg or Liechtenstein are unfit for giant China. 
However, given that both Luxembourg or Liechtenstein are part of the European Single Market, a market 
definition including all EU/EEA countries is suitable. 
157
  Computer systems review and testing is an art in itself. See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, 
Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, “Accountable Algorithms”, 165 U 
Pa. L. Rev. 633 (2017) (suggesting ex ante system design requirements, including commitments, as a 
precondition of effective systems monitoring). Technology in this field is rapidly evolving, however, and so 
does regulatory expertise.  
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the activity (while preserving customer data), or to appoint a commissioner to run the 
quarantined TechFin part of the business in the public interest. 
Impact on FinTech? 
In addition to regulating TechFins our proposed approaches could affect some FinTech firms. 
We note, however, that our indicated generous size-based exemption will likely not affect 
FinTech firms until they have reached a significant size. 
If our proposed threshold is passed a FinTech firm is likely to meet the two requirements set 
out for TechFins – trust and control. While are far from arguing that all Fintech firms shall be 
subject to regulation158 we see no reason to exempt FinTechs from our authorisation 
requirement. This would be unwieldy given that the line between FinTechs and TechFins is 
one of perspective rather than content. As a side effect, rendering data gathering and analytics 
for financial services subject to licensing would also respond effectively to calls of licensed 
entities for equal treatment. However, rather than entering a regulatory arm’s race, with 
innovation which both regulators and society likely to lose given the speed of innovation, our 
proposal addresses the core of the issue which is the trust and control which a typical TechFin 
business model entails and which if not addressed could prove damaging to customers and the 
financial system.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
We need banking but we don’t need banks anymore.159 
Usually, and probably incorrectly, attributed to Bill Gates, 1994. 
 
In the same way as Andreesen suggests that technology has now caught up the potential in the 
internet context, much the same may now be able to be said about technology and finance. 
Whether Bill Gates ever said words to the effect of those above, whoever did first say them 
was definitely ahead of their time in the 1990s.160 Perhaps today technological reality has 
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  Such a call would be ill-advised in light of the openness to innovation a financial system requires.  
159
  Edward Neumann, ‘Banking’s Role in Tomorrow’s Payments Systems: Insuring a Role for Banks’ (Paper 
presented at Bankers’ Roundtable, Washington D.C., June 1994) 17 cited in Eli M Noam, ‘Electronics and the 
Dim Future of Banks’ (Paper presented at Conference on Electronic Banking of the Fujitsu Research Institute, 
January 1996). Bill Gates is frequently cited as having said this: See Dan Schatt, Virtual Banking: A Guide to 
Innovation and Partnering (John Wiley & Sons, 2014) ch 2; Brett King, Bank 3.0: Why banking is no longer 
somewhere you go, but something you do (Marshall Cavendish International Asia Pte Ltd, 2012) 56; Andrew 
Grant and Gaia Grant, The Innovation Race: How to Change a Culture to Change the Game (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2016) 14; Tim Price, Investing Through the Looking Glass: A rational guide to irrational financial 
markets (Harriman House Limited, 2016); Jessica Xiaotong Zhang, 'Bill Gates Said That 'Banking Is 
Necessary, Banks are Not' But Banks Are Still Around Today', LinkedIn Pulse, 4 January 2017, available at: 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bill-gates-said-banking-necessary-banks-still-around-today-zhang (last 
accessed 19 April 2017); Ravi Venkatesan 'Banking is Necessary. Banks are not.' LinkedIn Pulse, 14 February 
2016, available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/banking-necessary-banks-ravi-venkatesan> (last accessed 
19 April 2017); R Gandhi (Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India), New paradigm in banking: 
banking is necessary, not banks - really?', Bank for International Settlements (17 August 2016), available at: 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r160822b.htm> (last accessed 19 April 2017). 
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  See Amy Cortese & Kelley Holland, “Bill Gates Is Rattling the Teller’s Window”, Bloomberg, 31 Oct. 1994, 
available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1994-10-30/bill-gates-is-rattling-the-tellers-window. 
See also Bill & Melinda Gates 2015 letter, sub ‘Three: Banking Mobile banking will help the poor transform 
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caught up to their vision. As we have suggested throughout this paper, TechFin may be the 
single most important development in financial services going forward, as digitisation enables 
datafication.161 
First, TechFins are not simply a progression of FinTechs but instead represent a brand new 
type of market participant. They have their origin in Tech or e-commerce environments which 
are typically connected to a multitude of clients (both consumers and/or small businesses) and 
a very deep well of data. As TechFins reach a significant size, they often do so having 
established an international network, and having gathered a very meaningful dataset. This data 
gives them a real advantage in the provision of financial services. TechFins may first enter the 
world of finance by providing their data, either raw or processed, to established financial 
services firms and/or FinTech startups, but over time the likelihood is that many will start 
providing financial services directly to their customers.  
Second, TechFins may be able to provide far more efficient financial services for society. In 
particular, they may reduce transaction costs and improve decision-making by using/providing 
a more comprehensive dataset than that to which established financial intermediaries have 
access. Both together could result in an increased level of financial inclusion for SMEs, 
consumers and the underprivileged in developing and developed parts of the world. 
Third, established thresholds for the imposition of financial regulation such as the solicitation 
of customers, deposit-taking, pooling of assets, or discretion over client assets may often fail 
to subject TechFins to regulation. In turn, regulators will be unable to enforce customer 
protection measures and monitor and mitigate systemic risk. Moreover, protected factors in 
society may often be put at risk, at times unwittingly, by TechFins. 
Fourth, if financial regulation matters in furthering market efficiency162 and customer 
protection,163 TechFins should be subjected to it when offering financial services. Moreover, 
TechFins will provide uneven competition to established licensed intermediaries if they are 
unrestricted by risk and compliance considerations in the build-up phase of their business 
model, and they do not bear the minimum costs of a regulated entity in terms of compliance 
and capital costs.  
Fifth, in the world of TechFin, most customers give their data away for free, looking for some 
side service, so ‘following the money’ (as traditional financial law does) is likely to fail. 
‘Following the data’ may provide an alternative, however. This alternative is not a mere policy 
choice, it is a necessity in a world where the value of data exceeds the value of traditional 
production if measured by market valuation. In a world where data is the new currency and 
where special legislation regulates intermediaries managing financial assets owed to and owned 
by others (as banks and asset managers do), it is a pressing need to adequately regulate ‘data 
                                                          
their lives’, available at: https://www.gatesnotes.com/2015-annual-letter?page=3&lang=en (last accessed 6 
April 2017). 
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 The Impact of Datafication on Strategic Landscapes, Ericsson (2014) 
https://www.ericsson.com/res/docs/2014/the-impact-of-datafication-on-strategic-landscapes.pdf.  (last 
accessed 21 April 2017) 4-5 ; Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that 
will Transform How We Live, Work and Think (Hachette UK, 2013). 
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 See Randall Dodd, The Economic Rationale for Financial Market Regulation, Financial Policy Forum 
Derivatives Study Center (December 2002) www.financialpolicy.org/fpfspr12.pdf (last accessed 21 April 
2017). 
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 See Consumer protection framework in financial services, Financial System Inquiry (2017) 
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intermediaries’ in addition to financial intermediaries given that both pose similar risk to 
individuals and society.  
Regulators should consider defining financial data gathering and analytics as a regulated 
activity, if the activity exceeds certain size thresholds. A threshold set as coverage of a 
percentage (perhaps 1-5%) of the overall population in the reference market may reflect the 
segregating line between ‘too small to care’ and ‘too large to ignore’. Above this threshold, 
TechFin regulation should focus on information gathering and ensuring regulatory access to 
data-based business models in order to ensure sound analytical methods and adherence to 
protected factors relevant to that reference market. If the risk analysis arising from the 
regulatory inquiry reveals systemic risk – for instance, because TechFin data is essential for 
one significant financial institution, or the TechFin provides the main client access for several 
financial institutions which together are of systemic relevance – systemic risk prevention 
measures should apply.  
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